BibTex@misc{ call={Distance Enlargement and Reduction Attacks on Ultrasound Ranging},author={Sahar Sedighpour ( NESL-UCLA). Srdjan Capkun ( IMM. Technical University of Denmark ). Saurabh Ganeriwal. Mani Srivastava ( NESL-UCLA )},abstract={Recently researchers have proposed a be of ranging and positioning techniques for wireless networks. However they all studied these techniques in non-adversarial settings. Distance estimation and positioning techniques are nevertheless highly vulnerable to attacks from dishonest nodes and malicious attackers. Internal attackers can inform false position and hold information in request to cheat on their locations and external attackers can change the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes. In this bring home the bacon we demonstrate two attacks on ultrasonic ranging systems: the wormhole attack by which the attackers reducethe distance measured between two honest nodes and the pulsedelay attack by which the attackers enlarge the measured hold. With these attacks we show that the attackers can arbitrarily change distances measured with ultrasonic ranging despite the authentication and integrity protection of the messages used in the ranging protocol. Based on this difference. B estimates its distance to A.},url={http://research cens ucla edu/pls/portal/url/item/0424D37AF355109CE0406180528D7106},year={2005},}
Recently researchers have proposed a number of ranging and positioning techniques for wireless networks. However they all studied these techniques in non-adversarial settings. Distance estimation and positioning techniques are nevertheless highly vulnerable to attacks from dishonest nodes and malicious attackers. Internal attackers can inform false lay and hold information in request to victimise on their locations and external attackers can change the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes. In this bring home the bacon we demonstrate two attacks on ultrasonic ranging systems: the wormhole attack by which the attackers reducethe hold measured between two honest nodes and the pulsedelay contend by which the attackers enlarge the measured distance. With these attacks we show that the attackers can arbitrarily change distances measured with ultrasonic ranging despite the authentication and integrity protection of the messages used in the ranging protocol. Based on this difference. B estimates its hold to A. [ADVERTHERE]Related article:
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cens/Posters/169
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